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ABSTRACT: We present an algorithm for constructing an optimal slate of sponsored search ad-
vertisements which respects the ordering that is the outcome of a generalized second price auction,
but which must also accommodate complicating factors such as overall budget constraints. The
algorithm is easily fast enough to use on the fly for typical problem sizes, or as a subroutine in an
overall optimization.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we consider the problem of constructing a maximum utility “slate” of ads for
display in response to either a search term, or content page requesting ads from a server. We shall
treat both of these essentially the same—that is that some ordered set of ads (the “slate”) is to be
returned in response to a “query”.
Let us denote the n bidders on this query by j = 1, . . . , n, and suppose that some form of
Generalized Second Price auction (GSP)[7] has been carried out, which induces a ranking of the
bidders. For simplicity, let the numerically ordered indices also indicate the bid ranking, initially
assumed to be determined solely by the bids—sometimes called the Overture ranking1. That is, if
we denote the bid of bidder j by Aj , then
A1 ≥ A2 . . . ≥ An.
Let m be the maximum number of positions, and let Tjp be the click-through rate (CTR) of bidder
j when his ad is at position p. Finally, let ρj be a “utility factor” associated with the appearance of
bidder j’s ad in response to the query.
We define a slate as an ordered subset S = {j1, . . . , jk}, where k ≤ m, of the ordered set of
ads {1, . . . , n}. Since we are initially assuming a second-price auction by bid value, bidder jp in
position p pays the bid Ajp+1 of the bidder occupying position p+1. In addition there is a minimum
bid ǫ, which is paid by the last bidder in the slate if and only if there are no lower bidders on the
query. Under these assumptions we wish to solve
max
S
U =
k∑
p=1
ρjpTjppAjp+1 (1)
subject to the requirement that j1, . . . , jk is an increasing set of indices, and k ≤ m.
Assuming the CTRs are independent, the utility U of the slate when the ρj are all unity is easily
seen to be the expected revenue from the slate. However there may be several reasons why we wish
to consider other values of the ρj . Some of the more important of these are:
1. The advertiser placing the ad may be at, or near, its budget, thus reducing the desirability
of showing it. This is our primary motivation, and this is a companion paper to [2], which
discusses this in detail. For convenience, we include a brief description of this model in an
Appendix.
2. “Ad Fatigue” induced by too-frequent showing of an ad may reduce its effectiveness. We
might therefore wish to penalize some ads which have been shown above some threshold.
3. We may be given (or wish to have) the CTRs as a product two components - a component
solely due to the ad, independent of position, and a position-only dependent component. In
this case we may reduce Tjp to a position only component Tp and an ad-dependent component
which becomes a contributor to ρj . However, this is not a necessary feature and we will
usually continue refer to the CTRs as Tjp.
1This assumption will later be generalized.
2
Yahoo! Research Report No. YR-2007-001
The treatment we give here is independent of the source of the ρj .
There is some superficial similarity with the well-known knapsack problem[9]—we are select-
ing a subset S of up to m items (the ads), subject to constraints. Also related is the “knapsack
auction” considered in [3]. Even more strongly related is the cardinality constrained knapsack
problem[6], since our slates have a fixed maximum size. However, the ordering requirement makes
the problem more specialized. Nevertheless, like the knapsack problem, our problem is amenable
to a dynamic programming approach.
2. Backward Recursion
We begin by giving a O(n2m) algorithm for solving (1) using a dynamic programming (DP)
algorithm with backward recursion[5]. For this approach, it is convenient to include m dummy
bidders, call them n + 1, . . . , n + m, with ρj = 0 and Aj = ǫ for j = n + 1, . . . , n + m. The
reason for doing this is that we only need to consider slates of size equal to m; smaller slates can be
padded with dummy bidders at the end to produce the same effect and make a slate of size exactly
m.
Take one j and one s such that 1 ≤ s ≤ m. Let us define a subslate starting from j at position
s as a set of increasing indices, S˜ = {js, js+1, . . . , jm} such that js = j. Let S˜(s, j) denote the set
of all such subslates. Consider the problem of computing the best “marginal-revenue-to-go”:
F (j, s) = max
S˜∈S˜(s,j)
m∑
p=s
ρjpTjppAjp+1 (2)
Suppose we fix js+1 and proceed optimally from there. If F (js+1, s+ 1) is known for all js+1 > j
then we can compute (2) in standard dynamic programming fashion as:
F (j, s) = max
js+1>j
ρjTjsAjs+1 + F (js+1, s + 1) (3)
We can start the DP algorithm by setting F (j, s) = 0 ∀ j = n + 1, . . . , n + m, s = 1, . . . ,m.
Now recurse backwards and compute F (j, s) ∀ s = 1, . . . ,m and j = n, . . . , 1. Finally, choose
maxj F (j, 1) to get the solution of (1) as well as the optimal slate.
3. An Optimal Path Approach
Frequently, problems that are amenable to dynamic programming can be cast in the form of a
shortest or longest path problem [4], and this is no exception. Let us define a network with nodes
Nj,p for p = 1, ...,m and j = p, ..., n + 1. We also define terminal nodes N0,0 and Nn+1,m+1. The
3
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Figure 1: Network with n > m
directed edges and their associated costs are defined as:
(N0,0, Nj,1) : c0,j,0 = 0
(j = 1, ..., n + 1)
(Ni,p, Nj,p+1) : ci,j,p = ρiAjTip
(j > i ≥ p = 1, ...,m − 1)
(Nj,m, Nn+1,m+1) : cj,n+1,m = ρjAj+1Tjp
(j = p, ..., n − 1)
(Nn,m, Nn+1,m+1) : cn,n+1,m = ρnǫTnm
(Nn+1,p, Nn+1,p+1) : cn+1,n+1,p = 0
(p = 1, ...,m)
where ci,j,p is the cost for the edge directed from Ni,p to Nj,p+1 and ǫ is the minimum bid as before.
Note that not all these edges are defined (or need to be defined) if n < m. (See figures 1 and 2).
Since the network is directed and acyclic, and the utilities/distances associated with the non-
trivial edges correspond to the utility of placing ad i in slot p, followed by ad j in slot p + 1, it is
easy to see that the longest path from N0,0 to Nn+1,m+1 maximizes (1) - or equivalently the shortest
path using the negatives of the costs defined above.
4
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Figure 2: Network with n < m
Very efficient algorithms are known for the shortest path problem, but in our case the problem
is small, so a simpler implementation suffices.
Since the forward recursion/ optimal path approach is more intuitive and visually appealing, we
shall use it for the remainder of this paper in the discussion of extensions and variations.
4. Extension to Revenue Ranking
The present scheme extends to what is sometimes known as revenue ranking, where the ads are
ranked not just by bid, but by “expected revenue” which is modeled as the product of the advertiser’s
bid Aj and Qj , which is the “quality score”, or “clickability”, for bidder j’s ad for this query. This
quantity is thought to better represent the value of a bidded ad than the raw bid.
The ads are now ranked according to this product, so that:
A1Q1 ≥ A2Q2 . . . ≥ AnQn.
To preserve the condition that the expected payment for a click is at least that of the next ranked
bidder, we require that the expected cost per click (CPC) of bidder jp must be at least Ajp+1
Qjp+1
Qjp
.
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Using this observation, the path technique extends to the expected revenue ranking scheme. In this
case the objective function is now:
Maximize U˜ =
m∑
p=1
ρjpAjp+1
Qjp+1
Qjp
Tjpp (4)
where The network model above remains the same except that the edge costs are now modified to
be:
(N0,0, Nj,1) : c0,j,0 = 0
(j = 1, ..., n + 1)
(Ni,p, Nj,p+1) : ci,j,p = ρiAj
Qj
Qi
Tip
(j > i ≥ p = 1, ...,m − 1)
(Nj,m, Nn+1,m+1) : cj,n+1,m = ρjAj+1
Qj+1
Qj
Tjp
(j = p, ..., n − 1)
(Nn,m, Nn+1,m+1) : cn,n+1,m = ρnǫTnm
(Nn+1,p, Nn+1,p+1) : cn+1,n+1,p = 0
(p = 1, ...,m)
5. Further Extensions
The path technique extends to other practically useful variants. Two of these include introducing
restrictions on the subset of ads which may be omitted from the slate, and use of a hybrid objective
function which is made up of a weighted sum of the first and second price utilities.
5.1. Restricted Omissions
The algorithm(s) we have been considering assume that any appropriate ordered subset of the
ads may be chosen which fits within the slate size. In practice this may not always be true. While it
is obviously legitimate to exclude ads from the limited space when the bids (or expected revenues)
are too low, it is not so obvious that this may be done for other reasons. For example, one of the
motivations we cited for using non-unit weights ρj was the need to accommodate bidders with lim-
ited budgets. One means of doing this is to allow budgeted bidders to be held out of the notional
auction—that is excluded from the slate. However, it is not obvious that this option should extend
to unbudgeted bidders. This must be a business decision. We therefore require a means of speci-
fying which ads (bidders) can be excluded for reasons other than low rank. We accomplish this by
specifying a mask or bit vector, which has a 1 if the ad can be excluded and a zero otherwise. We
then modify the algorithm as follows:
Since each arc in the network gives the utility of including a particular ad i in position p followed
by ad j, we consider only arcs such that:
1. For each position p we allow i to assume the values from p up to the first ad in rank order
which has a zero mask bit. Any subsequent ads are ignored for this p. This ensures that
6
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Figure 3: Reduced network with mask = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1)
the unmasked ad with the highest rank is not excluded, but that lower ranked ads which are
masked are not considered for the position p.
2. For each i chosen as above, the second index j shall only run from i + 1 through the next
unmasked ad. This ensures that if an ad i can be followed by an unmasked ad it will be the
next in rank order.
This scheme may be thought of as actually removing arcs from the networks such as those shown in
the figures, or more simply implemented by modifying the longest path algorithm with the rules we
have itemized. In Figure 3 we show the reduced network obtained from Figure 1 when we specify
that mask = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1). In practice however, we use the second technique of modifying the
algorithm.
5.2. Hybrid Objectives
Thus far we have assumed some form of generalized second price auctions is implicit in the
utility of the slate. However, even if the price per click is computed with such an assumption, we
may wish to include other factors in our utility calculation. For example we may wish to consider
7
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the first prices, on the assumption that in a truthful setting these are the actual values placed by
the bidders on a click for their ad and we wish to take this into account. Alternatively we may be
interested in the raw number of expected clicks. Both of these situations can be accommodated by
considering a composite weighted objective function which takes into account both first and second
prices in specifying the arc costs in the longest path algorithm. Let us define the hybrid objective
as:
Maximize Uˆ =
m∑
p=1
µjpAjpTjpp +
m∑
p=1
ρjpAjp+1
Qjp+1
Qjp
Tjpp (5)
which may be re-written:
Maximize Uˆ =
m∑
p=1
(µjpAjp + ρjpAjp+1
Qjp+1
Qjp
)Tjpp (6)
Then if we rewrite the relevant arc costs as:
ci,j,p = (µiAi + ρiAj
Qj
Qi
)Tip
(j > i ≥ p = 1, ...,m − 1)
cj,n+1,m = (µjAj + ρjAj+1
Qj+1
Qj
)Tjp
(j = p, ..., n − 1)
we may solve the optimal path problem as before.
This framework is very flexible and can lead to many extensions. For example if we wish to
have a weighted combination of expected revenue and expected clicks we may set the µj to 1/Aj .
Our colleague Zoe¨ Abrams has also informed us[1] that the dynamic programming approach to
column generation extends to the Vickery-Clark-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism.
6. Computational Results
All of the algorithms we have described are efficient in terms of number of operations, especially
since the numbers involved are relatively small in the on-line advertising framework. Typically m
is less than or equal to about 12, and the number of bidders n which need to be considered for
inclusion in a slate is less than 100, and may even be less than m.
We have implemented the forward algorithm in a straightforward way in C++, to be called as a
subroutine in the column generation algorithm of [2]. When run on a 32-bit Linux box with a 2.8
GHz Xeon processor, it takes an average of 25 microseconds for a sample of 5000 queries where
there are 12 ad positions, and between 1 and 77 candidate ads. This includes setting up the data
structures as well as the actual path computation, and is obtained without any attempt to optimize
the code other than using the -O2 option of the gcc compiler. We can therefore afford to execute
the algorithm repetitively, either in real time in an on-line setting, or repeated many times as a
subroutine.
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7. Conclusion
Sponsored search auctions have recently received considerable attention, but the subsequent
problem of how to implement, or adapt, the outcomes in the presence of complicating factors such
as budget constraints appears to have been less well studied. We have shown that this can be ac-
complished in cases of practical interest by a simple but very fast dynamic programming algorithm.
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Appendix
The algorithm(s) described in this paper were developed as a column generating subroutine for
the linear programming model (LP) described in [2] for optimizing sponsored search ad delivery
subject to budget constraints. The concept of a “slate” is put forward in that paper corresponding to
columns of the LP. We may formally state the LP as follows:
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Indices
i = 1, ..., N The queries
j = 1, ...,M The bidders
k = 1, ...,Ki The slates (for query i)
Data
dj The total budget of bidder j
vi Expected number of occurrences of
keyword i
aijk Expected cost to bidder j if slate k
is shown for keyword i
rik Objective function coefficient for slate k
for keyword i
Variables
xik Number of times to show slate k for keyword i
Constraints
(Budget) ∑
i
∑
k
aijkxik ≤ dj ∀j (7)
(Inventory) ∑
k
xik ≤ vi ∀i (8)
Objective
Maximize
∑
i
∑
k rikxik
Each column of the LP, that is the aijk values, corresponds to the expected cost per click (CPC)
to budgeted advertisers if their ad is clicked on when slate k is shown for query i. If there are more
then a handful of budgeted bidders for a query, the number of possible slates is enormous. We
therefore require a method for generating those columns which may be included in the LP optimum
solution (the well-known idea of “column generation”[8]). When the objective function coefficients
are the expected revenue from a slate (i.e. rik =
∑
j aijk), and the dual values corresponding to the
budget constraints are πj , the subproblem we wish to solve is of the form (4) with ρj = 1 − πj . If
the objective coefficients are the bid values (assumed to reflect a bidders true value for a click), the
subproblem is of the form (5) with µj = 1 and ρj = −πj . In either case, the slate generated can
potentially improve the LP solution if the value is greater than the dual value (say γi) for the ith
query volume constraint . See [2] for much greater detail.
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